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One question that has been on 
the minds of workers and policymakers 
alike over the past year is: when will a 
strong pickup in hiring take hold? The 
hiring of workers by businesses is a key 
component of the labor market. it is a 
common occurrence in both recessions 
and booms, and most individuals 
have been on one or both sides of the 
ost economic theories of hiring and job 
seeking assume that businesses post 
vacancies when they demand more labor. 
Workers then apply for the job, and the most 
qualified candidate is hired. however, as those who have 
ever recruited or applied for a job know, the recruiting 
process is considerably more complex. in this article, 
Jason Faberman discusses some recent research on how 
employers recruit. it shows that the extent to which a 
business uses various recruiting channels depends on the 
characteristics of the employer, how fast the employer 
is growing (or contracting), and the overall state of the 
economy.
hiring process. in fact, according to 
the bureau of Labor Statistics (bLS), 
nearly 5 million people, on average, 
are hired each month. even at its 
lowest point during the last recession, 
total hiring in the U.S. totaled 3.9 
million workers per month. Given 
how often hiring occurs, much of the 
economic evidence in this article will 
likely sound familiar to most readers. 
Nevertheless, the complexities and 
informalities associated with the 
hiring process have made it a difficult 
concept for economists to fully 
formalize in a theoretical framework, 
and consequently, these same elements 
have made it difficult to predict how 
aggregate hiring will behave over time. 
 Most economic theories of hiring 
and job seeking assume that businesses 
post vacancies when they demand 
more labor. Workers then apply for the 
job, and the most qualified candidate 
is hired. as those who have ever 
recruited or applied for a job know, 
however, the recruiting process is 
considerably more complex. First, it 
takes time for businesses to find a 
suitable candidate and for workers to 
find acceptable employment. economic 
theories characterizing these “search 
frictions” have become commonplace 
in economic research. in addition, 
businesses have multiple options for 
increasing their chances of hiring 
a qualified employee, for example, 
engaging in informal networking, 
increasing their recruiting efforts, 
or offering relatively generous pay or 
benefits. These channels make the 
recruiting process more complex, and 
economic theories on how businesses 
recruit have yet to fully capture these 
complexities.
in this article, i present some 
recent research that documents 
that the extent to which a business 
uses these other recruiting channels 
depends on its characteristics, such 
as its industry and the type of job it 
is recruiting for. it also depends on 
how fast the business is growing (or 
contracting). Last, it depends on the 
state of the economy. Recessions are 
periods when individuals find it hard 
to find work, and consequently, they 
are also times when businesses find it 
relatively easy to fill open positions.
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF 
HIRING AND RECRUITING
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of recruiting and hiring.1 These models 
are generally based on theories of labor 
market search and matching that were 
recently recognized in the awarding 
of the 2010 Nobel Prize in economics. 
The models evaluate how workers 
find new jobs and how firms find new 
workers, given that there are frictions 
in matching the two. That is, it takes 
time for workers to figure out what 
jobs are available, and it takes time for 
employers to evaluate candidates for 
jobs. These frictions cause unemployed 
workers and vacant jobs to exist in 
the labor market simultaneously. Over 
the years, such models have proven 
valuable in evaluating the behavior 
of hiring, wages, and unemployment, 
most often over the business cycle, 
and in evaluating various labor 
market policies, such as employment 
protection and unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
Central to many of these 
models is the notion of a vacancy 
or, more generally, that the frictions 
involved in matching workers to 
firms make recruiting a worker costly. 
Consequently, firms must weigh the 
expected cost of hiring a new worker, 
which consists of not only the wage 
they must pay but also the time and 
resources they must devote to the 
search process, against the expected 
benefit, which is generally how 
productive a firm expects its new hire 
to be. 
Starting from this basic premise, 
different theories of labor market 
search and matching diverge widely 
in how the recruiting process occurs. 
For example, some theories implicitly 
model a link between wages and 
recruiting behavior. These models 
of “directed search,” such as the one 
presented by espen Moen, postulate 
that workers observe the wages offered 
by firms before they decide where to 
apply. The implication from these 
models is that firms can reduce the 
time it takes to find a worker by 
offering a wage higher than what their 
competitors offer (and thereby increase 
their number of applicants). Similarly, 
in his book, Christopher Pissarides 
presents a model in which firms vary 
in how much effort they put into 
recruiting rather than the wages they 
offer in trying to fill their vacancies. 
in another example, boyan 
Jovanovic addresses the uncertainty 
often associated with the hiring 
process by constructing a model in 
which workers are hired by (matched 
with) firms and both must learn about 
the match’s “quality” over time. That 
is, they both learn whether or not 
each is happy with the employment 
relationship. This type of model 
implies that recruiting efforts are just 
one cost in a longer process to figure 
out whether a worker is a good fit with 
that firm. 
There are also theories that 
ignore the search and matching aspect 
of recruiting and focus instead on 
its other complexities. For example, 
Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz 
present a model in which firms design 
contracts to screen their applicants 
to improve their chances of finding a 
suitable match.2 James Montgomery 
develops a model in which the social 
networks of the existing workforce 
provide an alternative recruiting 
channel for firms. 
Together, these lines of research 
underscore the need to understand 
exactly how firms recruit in the 
real world. The different types of 
models provide for very different 
characterizations of how firms hire 
workers and thus provide differing 
views on which channels are most 
important for recruiting, on how 
much recruiting differences affect 
the behavior of the labor market, 
and on what policies may best spur 
hiring. Only empirical evidence on 
employers’ recruiting practices can 
shed light on which aspects of these 
models best describe what happens 
in the real world. in the remainder of 
this article, i summarize the existing 
evidence on these recruiting practices. 
a central theme that stands out is that 
no one theory captures what goes on 
in the data. This is partly because the 
different types of recruiting practices 
that firms use often depend on the 
characteristics of the position they are 
trying to fill. it is also because certain 
practices, such as informal recruiting 
methods, are not well captured at all 
by the existing theories.
1 Seminal work on this topic includes the 1985 
study by Christopher Pissarides and the 1994 
work by Dale Mortensen and Pissarides. Their 
work spawned a large literature on the issue, 
much of which is summarized in the survey 
piece by Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer, and 
Randall Wright. Mortensen and Pissarides, 
along with Peter Diamond, shared the 2010 
Nobel Prize in economics.
2 The Rothschild-Stiglitz model is explicitly 
about contracts in insurance markets, but it has 
been extended to an understanding of labor 
markets.
It takes time for workers to figure out what jobs 
are available, and it takes time for employers 
to evaluate candidates for jobs. These frictions 
cause unemployed workers and vacant jobs 
to exist in the labor market simultaneously.Business Review  Q4  2011   11 www.philadelphiafed.org
EMPIRICAL ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ON RECRUITING
Perhaps surprisingly, economic 
research on how firms recruit is 
relatively thin. This contrasts with 
the amount of research that exists 
on how individuals (both employed 
and unemployed) find new work 
(i.e., the labor supply counterpart to 
recruiting).3 a major reason for this 
is a severe lack of data on recruiting. 
There are few surveys that capture the 
data needed for a complete study of 
recruiting behavior, and these surveys 
usually have relatively few observations 
and are often outdated.
another major reason for the 
paucity of research on recruiting is 
that informal recruiting has proven to 
be an important channel. This point 
has been stressed in research dating 
back to work in 1966 by albert Rees. 
Formal recruiting methods generally 
refer to explicit efforts by a business 
to find and hire a worker. These 
methods include posting a help wanted 
sign in the window or an ad in the 
newspaper or on the internet, posting 
an opening at a job center (a common 
practice in european labor markets), 
and posting a vacancy announcement 
with an employment agency. While 
data on these recruiting methods are 
sparse, the methods themselves employ 
tangible measures of recruiting that 
an economist could study. informal 
recruiting methods refer to hires made 
through channels such as referrals 
from acquaintances or existing 
employees, informal contacts made 
through networking, and the hiring 
of walk-in applicants who inquired 
about work without the existence 
of a formal job opening. Given their 
informal nature, these practices prove 
difficult to accurately measure even 
when surveys on recruiting explicitly 
try to account for them. Other actions 
related to recruiting have also proven 
difficult to accurately measure. These 
include the number of applicants and 
interviews for a particular position and 
the efforts a business undertook to hire 
someone.
Nevertheless, research by Rees 
and more recent work by Jed DeVaro 
provide some useful insights on how 
firms recruit. For example, Rees 
finds that informal recruiting is an 
important part of hiring, primarily 
because it allows businesses to gather 
more information about a potential 
hire in a less costly way than more 
formal methods. Using a survey 
of employers in the Chicago area, 
Rees is able to document a variety 
of informal channels that firms use, 
such as relaxed hiring standards, and 
finds that the benefits these channels 
afford often made them preferable to 
the more formal methods provided by 
placement agencies that specialized in 
recruiting workers. DeVaro shows that 
the type of recruiting method used is 
closely related to the starting wage of 
the position. he finds that informal 
recruitment methods (such as referrals) 
have longer vacancy durations but 
lead to higher wage hires. The findings 
of both researchers underscore the 
importance of recruiting channels 
outside of the standard method of 
posting a vacancy.
EXISTING EVIDENCE ON 
VACANCIES AND HIRING
Other research has also shed light 
on how firms recruit. The existing 
evidence can be grouped into three 
categories: recruiting based on the 
characteristics of the business and the 
job, recruiting based on how much a 
business is growing (or contracting), 
and recruiting behavior over the 
business cycle.
Recruiting Behavior Varies with 
Business Characteristics. From an 
economist’s point of view, one of the 
most important metrics for analyzing 
recruiting is the cost of recruiting, in 
terms of time, money, and resources. 
a big part of this cost is how long it 
takes to fill a vacant position. an open 
vacancy represents an unfilled job, 
meaning that a business has profitable 
work to be done, but there is no one 
currently doing it. Thus, one aspect 
of the cost of a vacancy that remains 
open is the opportunity cost of the 
unfilled position. a vacancy also 
signifies that there is some form of 
active recruiting undertaken by firms. 
This implies that the firm is devoting 
resources — in terms of the time 
and effort of its existing workers, as 
well as potential direct costs, such as 
advertising expenses — to recruiting 
a new worker. These costs and their 
effects on the recruiting behavior of 
individual firms can vary widely by the 
firm’s industry and the characteristics 
of both the job and the firm.
Informal recruiting methods refer to 
hires made through channels such as 
referrals from acquaintances or existing 
employees, informal contacts made through 
networking, and the hiring of walk-in 
applicants who inquired about work without 
the existence of a formal job opening.
3 For example, see the 1999 review article by 
henry Farber and the studies by Robert hall, 
Shigeru Fujita and Gary Ramey, and Michael 
elsby, Ryan Michaels, and Gary Solon, to name 
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in my research with Steven Davis 
and John haltiwanger, we show that 
one useful metric of how successful 
firms are in recruiting workers is the 
vacancy yield. The vacancy yield is the 
number of hires per vacancy posted 
(i.e., the success, in terms of a hire, of 
an employer’s recruiting efforts).  it is 
a simplified measure of the job-filling 
rate, which is the speed at which 
employers fill their vacancies.4 When 
analyzed alongside the rates of hiring 
and vacancy posting, the vacancy yield 
can provide a more complete picture of 
the recruiting behavior of firms.
Table 1 shows how the number of 
hires as a percent of employment (the 
hiring rate), the number of vacancies 
as a percent of total jobs (employment 
plus vacancies), and vacancy yields 
vary across industries and across 
the major U.S. regions. The data 
come from published statistics from 
the bLS’s Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS). 
On average, the hiring rate is 3.8 
percent of nonfarm employment and 
the vacancy rate is 2.9 percent of total 
jobs (employment plus vacancies, i.e., 
filled plus unfilled jobs). The vacancy 
yield averages 1.3 hires over the month 
per vacancy open at the beginning 
of the month. in theory, the vacancy 
yield would take a value between zero 
and one. in practice, however, the 
yield can be greater than one, as is 
the case in Table 1. This is because 
data on hiring are often measured as 
a total amount over a period, while 
vacancies are usually measured as a 
stock at a specific point in time, in this 
case, at the beginning of the month. 
Consequently, the vacancy yield will 
capture the hires from vacancies that 
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics on Hiring and Vacancies
Source: author’s calculations from published JOLTS statistics from January 2001-May 2010. hir-
ing rates are percentages of employment. Vacancy rates are percentages of employment plus va-
cancies (i.e., total jobs). The vacancy yield is the number of hires during the month per vacancy 
open at the beginning of the month. The employment growth rate is the difference between 
total hires and total separations as a percent of employment. it is comparable to the growth rate 










Total Nonfarm 3.8 2.9 1.32 -0.02
Total Private 4.2 3.0 1.41 -0.04
Selected industries
Construction 6.0 1.9 3.24 -0.17
Manufacturing 2.5 1.9 1.35 -0.38
Retail Trade 4.8 2.5 1.93 -0.07
Transportation & 
Utilities
3.2 2.2 1.45 -0.07
information 2.7 3.2 0.83 -0.30
Finance & 
insurance
2.5 3.3 0.74 -0.01
Real estate 4.0 2.5 1.55 -0.02
Professional & 
business Services
5.4 3.8 1.41 -0.01
education 2.5 2.0 1.24 0.21
health Services 3.0 4.1 0.73 0.21
Leisure & 
hospitality
6.8 3.6 1.88 0.08
Government 1.6 1.9 0.83 0.06
Region
Midwest 3.7 2.5 1.44 -0.08
Northeast 3.3 2.7 1.23 0.02
South 4.0 2.9 1.34 0.01
West 3.9 2.9 1.34 -0.06 
4 The main difference between the vacancy 
yield and the job-filling rate is that the latter 
accounts for the fact that some vacancies can 
be both posted and filled within a period, and 
therefore not show up in the data that are used 
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are posted and filled within the period 
but not from the vacancies that open 
during the period.5 in addition, hiring 
done through informal channels may 
never use a vacancy, which could also 
push the average amount of hires per 
vacancy above one if these channels 
are prevalent enough. There is a 
large variation in these rates and in 
hires per vacancy across industries 
and across regions. industries with 
high worker turnover (and thus high 
hiring rates), such as construction, 
retail, and leisure and hospitality, have 
relatively high vacancy yields. The 
high vacancy yield, in part, reflects the 
high turnover in these industries, but it 
also reflects the fact that many of their 
hires come from recruiting channels 
other than posting a formal vacancy. 
The converse is true for industries 
such as government, which has both 
low turnover and a low vacancy yield, 
5 My research with Davis and haltiwanger, as 
well as several other studies (e.g., the study by 
Kenneth burdett and elizabeth Cunningham), 
finds that vacancy durations are relatively short, 
with the average vacancy remaining open for 
about three weeks.
the latter partly reflecting the fact 
that government agencies tend to have 
more formal recruiting practices than 
the private sector. The differences 
across regions generally reflect 
differences in the mix of jobs across 
areas, but they also reflect differences 
in growth, which generally coincides 
with a greater churning of workers 
(through greater migration, job-
hopping, etc.).
Table 1 also shows that there is 
considerable variation across regions. 
The generally faster-growing South 
and West tend to have higher hiring 
rates (and, consequently, higher 
turnover), while the Midwest has the 
lowest growth but the highest vacancy 
yield. The Northeast, which tends 
to have a disproportionate share of 
industries and occupations that are low 
turnover and high wage, has both low 
hiring rates and low vacancy yields. 
Research has also found that 
recruiting efforts and recruiting 
outcomes tend to be highly related to 
the starting wage offered. For example, 
Table 2, which is replicated from 
research by John barron, John bishop, 
TABLE 2








Hours Spent Recruiting, 
Screening & Interviewing
All Firms 10.73 6.3 1.3 8.0
Size of Firm
1-9 workers 10.10 5.2 1.2 6.2
10-25 workers 10.31 6.3 1.3 7.1
26-250 workers 11.09 7.0 1.4 9.4
251 or more workers 13.00 8.3 1.3 12.7
 
Source: author’s calculations and replication of estimates from barron, bishop, and Dunkelberg. The original estimates come from the 1980 em-
ployment Opportunities Pilot Project.
and William Dunkelberg, shows that 
larger firms tend to pay higher wages, 
interview more workers, and invest 
more time in recruiting. This occurs 
primarily because high-wage jobs 
tend to require high or specialized 
skills. Finding workers with such skills 
often proves difficult. in addition, the 
opportunity cost of getting a poorly 
matched worker is relatively higher for 
these positions. 
as some of my research with 
Guido Menzio shows, high-wage jobs 
also tend to have longer vacancy 
durations (Table 3). This is especially 
true for managerial and professional 
and technical jobs. again, the skills 
required for the job strongly affect how 
much firms are willing to invest in the 
search process. Table 3 also shows that 
a sizable fraction (20 percent) of hiring 
occurs without any recruiting, as 
reported by the firms surveyed.6 This 
is some of the most striking evidence 
in support of the informal channels 
6 The survey asks how long it took for firms to 
fill their last vacancy, allowing for the special 
case where “no recruiting” took place.14   Q4  2011 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
stressed by Montgomery, Rees, and 
DeVaro as an important recruiting 
tool. 
Recruiting Behavior Varies with 
Business Growth. in my research with 
Davis and haltiwanger, we find that 
how fast a business is growing affects 
how it recruits. Namely, we find that 
the hiring rate rises nearly one-for-
one with a business’s employment 
growth rate but the vacancy rate rises 
much less than one-for-one with the 
growth rate (Figure 1). This implies 
that the vacancy yield (which is 
measured as hires per vacancy) also 
rises with the growth rate (Figure 2). 
The relationship of these variables 
to business growth is predominantly 
limited to when businesses expand. 
Contracting businesses have similar 
hiring rates, vacancy rates, and 
vacancy yields regardless of the size of 
the contraction.
The behavior of hires is mostly 
mechanical (the dashed line in Figure 
1 represents the minimum hiring rate 
needed to grow by a certain percent), 
but there is no mechanical reason 
why the vacancy rate or vacancy yield 
should exhibit such behavior. in fact, 
most economic models of labor market 
search and matching imply a vacancy 
yield that is unrelated to business 
growth.  in our research, however, 
we find that the vacancy yield rises 
even after controlling for the fact 
that fast-growing businesses may just 
post and fill vacancies very quickly. 
There are several reasons for this to 
be the case, although more research is 
needed to determine its exact causes. 
One hypothesis is that firms relax 
their hiring standards when trying 
to expand rapidly, making it easier to 
fill their vacant positions. another 
hypothesis is that there are scale 
economies in recruiting, meaning that 
firms are able to benefit from added 
efficiencies when trying to hire many 
people at once. yet another hypothesis 
is that firms rely more heavily on 
informal recruiting channels when 
trying to expand quickly, implying that 
hiring per (formal) vacancy would rise 
with growth.
Recruiting Behavior Varies over 
the Business Cycle.  Finally, and 
perhaps most important, recruiting 
behavior varies over the business 
cycle. Obviously, when times are good, 
businesses are more likely to post 
vacancies and hire. Less obvious is 
the fact that a business’s success rate 
TABLE 3
















14.71 37.1 22.0 9.3 8.0
Management 16.12 49.1 29.4 11.0 5.3
Clerical 9.32 17.7 15.1 16.4 8.7
Sales 10.64 29.7 16.9 13.0 7.2
Personal & Other 
Services
8.08 9.9 18.7 9.6 4.8
Processing & 
Machinery
11.36 19.3 25.4 9.3 7.2
Structural Work 15.58 23.4 27.8 8.3 6.3
Source: author's work with Guido Menzio. estimates come from the 1980 and 1982 waves of the employment Opportunities Pilot Project. The 
fraction of hires with “no recruiting” refers to positions that were reported to have a vacancy open for zero days.Business Review  Q4  2011   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
7 The time series in Figure 4 ends earlier (De-
cember 2009) than the series in Figure 3 (July 
2010), which is why the job-filling rate does 
not exhibit the same decline observed with the 
vacancy yield. 
Hiring and Vacancy Rates by
Business-Level Growth
FIGURE 1
Vacancy Yield by Business-Level Growth
FIGURE 2
in recruiting and its potential use of 
alternative recruiting channels vary 
over the business cycle as well.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of 
the hiring rate, the vacancy rate, and 
the vacancy yield over the past 10 
years, again from published JOLTS 
statistics. Recessions are indicated by 
the shaded bars. hiring and vacancies 
are procyclical. They both increase 
during expansions and fall during 
recessions. Two things stand out for 
the hiring and vacancy rates in Figure 
3. First, relative to the earlier recession, 
the 2008-09 period was a time of very 
steep declines in the rates of hiring 
and vacancy posting. Second, over the 
full period, the vacancy rate is more 
volatile than the hiring rate (that is, it 
rises relatively more during expansions 
and falls relatively more during 
recessions).
 The vacancy yield is 
countercyclical. it rises during 
recessions and falls during booms and 
thus moves opposite to both hires and 
vacancies primarily because it is easier 
to fill openings during recessions when 
there are more unemployed workers 
applying for relatively fewer positions.
Figure 4 shows the movements 
of the daily job-filling rate and the 
monthly escape rate from unemploy-
ment over a longer time series.7 The 
job-filling rate (the day-by-day rate 
at which vacancies are filled) is an 
estimate that comes from my research 
with Davis and haltiwanger. as noted 
earlier, it is similar in concept to the 
vacancy yield. The main exception is 
that the job-filling rate accounts for 
the fact that some hires come from 
vacancies that are posted and filled 
within a month (such vacancies never 
appear as part of the monthly vacancy 
Source: estimates from my study with Steven Davis and John haltiwanger, which uses 
establishment micro-data from JOLTS pooled over 2001-2006. The dashed line represents a 45-
degree line emanating from the origin, representing the minimum amount of hiring to achieve a 
given growth rate. 
Source: estimates from my study with Steven Davis and John haltiwanger, which uses 
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8 See, for example, an earlier Business Review 
article by Shigeru Fujita. 
Hiring, Vacancies, and the Vacancy Yield
over Time
FIGURE 3
Unemployment Escape Rate and
Job-Filling Rate over Time
FIGURE 4
data). its main limitation is that its cal-
culation is more involved than that of 
the vacancy yield, so it is not as easily 
obtained from published statistics and, 
consequently, not as current as the va-
cancy yield series in Figure 3. The job-
filling rate in Figure 4 is at the daily 
frequency, so it implies that businesses 
fill, on average, about 5.7 percent of 
their open vacancies on a given day. 
The monthly escape rate from unem-
ployment is the percent of unemployed 
individuals from the previous month 
who are no longer employed in the 
current month. One shortcoming is 
that the measure does not distinguish 
between individuals who found new 
work and those who dropped out of the 
labor force, although research suggests 
that the escape rate closely tracks the 
rate at which the unemployed actually 
find new jobs.8
Despite the differences in mea-
surement, Figure 4 shows that the 
job-filling rate, like its counterpart the 
vacancy yield, is strongly countercycli-
cal. it exhibited its largest spike at the 
height of the 1982 recession, rising to 
over 11 percent of vacancies per day. 
The spike at the height of the most re-
cent recession, at 8.6 percent, was the 
second highest on record. businesses 
found it hardest to fill their vacancies 
during the boom times of the 1998-
2000 period. The movements in the 
unemployment escape rate are almost 
a mirror image of the movements in 
the job-filling rate. The contrasting 
behavior of the two series over time is 
intuitive: recessions are periods when 
it is hard for workers to find a job but 
easy for firms to fill their vacancies. 
The opposite is true of expansions. it 
is worth noting that during the last 
recovery, the rate at which individuals 
escaped unemployment has remained 
well below the next lowest trough on 
Source: author’s calculations from published JOLTS data for nonfarm employment, January 2001-
May 2010. Rates are expressed as percentages of employment. The vacancy yield is measured as 
the number of hires during the month per vacancy open at the start of the month. Shaded areas 
represent NbeR-dated recessions. 
Source: author’s calculations from published CPS unemployment data, and vacancy rate estimates 
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record. This is a primary reason why 
the unemployment rate has remained 
persistently high during this period. 
The divergence currently remains a 
puzzle to economists. a rise in struc-
tural unemployment, perhaps due to 
the downturn in the housing market, 
changes in the industry composition 
of the economy, or changes in govern-
ment policies (such as extensions of 
unemployment insurance benefits) 
have all been suggested as potential 
causes, although much work remains 
to be done on the issue.
CONCLUSION
hiring and recruiting are 
key features of the labor market. 
While these features are common 
occurrences often experienced by most 
individuals, many economic models 
of the labor market still grapple with 
dealing with their complexities. The 
models do well in capturing the notion 
that many costs and frictions exist 
in the matching of workers to firms, 
but they have yet to fully characterize 
the fact that businesses use multiple 
channels, both formal and informal, 
to attract and recruit workers. existing 
evidence on these channels shows that 
the extent to which firms use these 
channels, and their success with them, 
varies with the type of firm, the type 
of job, how much the firm is looking to 
expand, and economic conditions. B R
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